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Household Financial Assets  






Systematic information on household financial asset holdings in developing countries is 
very sparse; we review some available data and current policy debates. Although 
financial asset holdings by households are highly concentrated, deeper financial systems 
are correlated with improved income distribution. For low-income countries, the 
relevant question for poor households is not how much financial assets they have, but 
whether they have any access to financial products at all. Building on and synthesizing 
disparate data collection efforts by others, we produce new estimates of access 
percentages for over 150 countries. Across countries, access is negatively correlated 
with poverty rates, but the correlation is not a robust one, thus the supposed anti-poverty 
potential of financial access remains econometrically elusive. Despite policy focus on 
the value of credit instruments, it is deposit products that tend to be the first to be used 
as prosperity increases, before more sophisticated savings products and borrowing. 
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The financial sector plays a multidimensional role in the process of development. It 
mobilizes and concentrates resources for investment and allocates them based on an 
assessment of risk and return, judging creditworthiness and monitoring performance. It 
offers risk-reduction and risk-pooling services that have both direct effects on welfare 
(by providing insulation from shocks) and indirect effects on growth, by making 
riskier—but potentially high-yield—investments in human and physical capital 
accessible. While much of the recent literature focuses on the interaction of enterprises, 
large and small, with financial markets and financial intermediaries, households are 
important consumers of financial products and household behaviour influences the scale 
and asset mix of finance. Furthermore, poverty and welfare can be strongly influenced 
by the degree to which households have access to the formal financial sector.  
 
This paper reviews these three dimensions (mobilization, access and risk-reduction) in a 
quantitative context, concentrating on illustrating some of the very limited data that are 
available for developing countries. Because the discussion combines data, econometric 
and conceptual issues, we begin with an extended introduction and summary allowing 
the main threads of the story to be presented without technical digression.  
Mobilization and concentration 
The first dimension relates to the role of household financial asset accumulation in 
helping mobilize resources that can be effectively deployed for productive investment, 
thereby accelerating growth. There is clearly something to this mechanism, inasmuch as 
the well-documented link between banking depth and subsequent economic growth 
almost necessarily entails household accumulation of bank deposits to back the 
intermediation that is involved here. However, it needs to be recognized that financial 
asset holdings are highly concentrated, even more so than non-financial assets, to the 
extent that the financial assets of the lower quartiles can be largely ignored in any 
discussion of national resource mobilization. This is true for the United States and other 
advanced economies, and likely holds with even more force for developing countries. 
 
Wealthy households in many developing countries prefer to hold a relatively large 
fraction of their assets in safer, more transparent, more diversified and more efficient 
financial markets offshore.1 Since such holdings may be illegal because of remaining 
exchange controls, or because taxes were not paid, offshore holdings would not show up 
in survey data, and this is likely one of the reasons that most developing countries have 
                                                 
1 Identified offshore banking deposits as a share of GDP are statistically uncorrelated across countries 
with per capita GDP (Hanson 2003). Hence, since the elasticity of total bank deposits with respect to 
income is well over one, we may conclude that poorer countries tend to hold a higher share of their 
financial assets offshore. 2 
not conducted comprehensive surveys of financial asset holdings of households. The 
share of financial assets in the average household’s domestic portfolio increases with 
the national level of development (and in advanced economies it increases also with the 
wealth of the household). Within financial assets, holdings of risky assets are even more 
concentrated: for these, holdings below the top five per cent of wealthholders are 
nationally negligible. Curiously, even though the financial assets of the poor are in 
aggregate negligible, it appears that countries with deeper financial systems have less 
absolute poverty, even after taking account of mean national income. This suggests that 
a deep financial system also affects the structure of the economy in subtle ways that are 
relevant for the inclusiveness of economic development. 
Access 
The main focus of current policy concern with regard to household finance in 
developing countries is the perceived need to increase the access of poor households to 
basic financial services; deposits, payments, insurance and credit. In other words, 
policy-driven research for such countries has focused not on allocation decisions 
between different assets, or on total amounts held, but simply on whether a participation 
threshold has been reached.  
 
Whether examined from household survey data, or from inference based on numbers of 
bank and other financial intermediary accounts, it is clear that the fraction of households 
using2 the services of formal3 financial intermediaries is small in most developing 
countries. In contrast, access percentages in the 1980s and 1990s are recorded for 
households in advanced economies (where the relevant policy issues are best discussed 
in the language of exclusion rather than of access). Despite the lack of concrete 
evidence, it is also generally believed that there is also a direct role for the financial 
system in reducing poverty by reaching more households with microfinance services. 
But the scale of this impact remains unclear. Access percentages are correlated with 
poverty rates and national per capita income, but not very closely. However, 
conditioning on mean national income, attempts (including in this paper) to detect a 
statistically robust causal relationship on cross-country data between financial access 
and poverty have not been successful to date. Intriguingly, then, the strongest cross-
country econometric evidence for a financial sector impact on poverty relates to 
financial depth (total value of private credit in relation to GDP), and not financial access 
(percentage of households with an account). Whether this is a causal effect is unclear. 
 
                                                 
2 There is an obvious and important conceptual distinction between access and usage, and surveys often 
explore this (for further discussion, see Honohan 2004b). In the present paper we treat the terms 
synonymously, which may not be too bad an approximation when equating access to the use of any 
financial product. 
3 The discussion is generally confined to the formal financial system and as such excludes borrowing 
from informal lenders and participation in, for example, informal rotating savings and credit schemes. 3 
Microeconomic studies on the impact of microfinance on poverty are also surprisingly 
inconclusive. Although beneficiaries of microfinance schemes are vocal in their praise 
and gratitude, a comprehensive assessment needs to consider displacement effects and 
endogeneity of financial access. Only in a few cases so far has it been possible to devise 
convincing ways of adjusting for, or excluding, these complicating factors. On balance, 
most observers regard microfinance interventions as poverty-reducing, while continuing 
to call for further analysis of methodologies for increasing cost-effectiveness and 
sustainability of these initiatives, most of which continue to benefit from external 
subsidies. 
Risk reduction and the asset mix 
Turning to the allocation of household assets among financial assets with different risk 
profiles, the focus shifts to risk-reduction for these households. After all, given the 
ability of intermediaries to pool risk, household behaviour is only of limited importance 
in influencing the national supply of risk-finance. Much of the recent literature on 
household financial asset allocation has been driven by a concern that households are 
not allocating their savings in an optimal manner. The suggestion is often made that, 
whether because of erroneous risk calculations, or simply out of ignorance, households 
fail to adopt strategies and products that would give them a dominant risk-return mix. 
To the extent that household investment allocation errors are confined to lower-wealth 
households, they are unlikely to significantly affect macroeconomic aggregates. 
 
For developing countries, the bulk of the population has no practical access to 
sophisticated financial instruments (or even to such products as medium-term residential 
mortgages). As economies become more prosperous, increasing proportions of the 
population begin to move beyond deposit products into life insurance, loans and other 
more sophisticated products. To that extent, despite considerable interest in the topic, 
the relevance of such concerns for poverty reduction and growth remain for the present 
limited. 
Implications 
In considering policy with respect to household finance in developing countries, it is not 
unreasonable to distinguish rather sharply between the objectives of ‘finance for 
growth’ and ‘finance for all’. Sustained national economic growth calls for the 
intermediation of sizable resources through an efficient financial system. To the extent 
that these resources come from the savings of households, it refers to relatively 
prosperous households—in this context only the top few deciles need to be considered. 
The more developed the economy, the more deciles become relevant. Policy designed to 
mobilize a larger volume of funds for intermediation should therefore be directed to 
matters that affect behaviour of the upper deciles. Such policies would include those 
affecting political confidence, macroeconomic stability and expected after-tax returns 
on financial savings. 4 
A rather different set of policies comes to the fore in seeking to expand the number of 
households with access. These include regulatory design for microfinance institutions, 
ensuring that measures designed to protect consumers against loss do not impose costs 
so heavy as to deter entry into this low end of the market, characterized by low margins 
but potentially high volume. Current policy concerns in advanced economies on sub-
optimal allocation of the household portfolio remain of secondary importance in most 
developing countries. Instead, legal, regulatory and tax policies affecting the cost and 
availability to lower income households, of such products as insurance and home 
construction lending, loom large on the policy agenda. 
 
The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. The first presents some known 
statistical regularities about the variation across income groups and countries of 
household financial asset holdings. Section 2 discusses the channels through which 
household financial asset holdings affect national growth and poverty. Section 3 turns to 
the question of how widespread is access by households to financial assets, presenting 
new data for over 150 countries, and using this data to assess whether such access per se 
helps to reduce aggregate poverty. Section 4 briefly discusses household choice among 
different financial assets. Concluding remarks are in Section 5. 
1  Household financial assets: how holdings vary across income groups and 
countries 
Our knowledge of the pattern of household financial asset holdings varies greatly by 
country. The US has the most comprehensive and apparently reliable data in the form of 
the triennial Survey of Consumer Finances, preliminary results of the most recent wave 
from 2004 have just been published by the Federal Reserve Board (Bucks et al. 2006, 
updating Aizcorbe et al. 2003). Earlier waves of the US survey are thoroughly 
compared with data for four other advanced economies, Germany, Italy, Netherlands 
and the UK, in Guiso et al. (2002). Other advanced countries for which data are 
available include Korea and Japan. Data for developing countries are, however, very 
sketchy and current data collection exercises in this area are focused more on measuring 
access or participation than on quantifying asset magnitudes. In this review we draw on 
much more limited data mainly on savings balances collected in general household 
surveys for Ghana, Jamaica and Vietnam, on a 2003 module on household assets and 
liabilities in India collected as part of the 59th National Sample Survey (NSSO 2005), 
on a survey of investment in stock market assets in India (Kar et al. 2003) and on a 
household survey carried out in 2002 in rural and urban areas in China by CASS (Li and 
Zhao 2006). They show some commonalities with other advanced economies, but also 
some differences which may be due to survey limitations. 
 
Despite the sketchiness of data sources, some stylized facts can be adduced by 
reasonable extrapolation and interpolation from what we do have. One cannot, of 
course, rely wholly on the assumption that cross-sectional patterns within economies—5 
variations in the pattern of asset allocation by such characteristics as age, education and 
wealth—can be extrapolated from the rich countries for which we do have cross-
sectional data to the poor. Nevertheless, some of those patterns likely do hold up 
qualitatively (and we will show the extent to which some of them are confirmed in our 
handful of developing countries for which some data are available) and the patterns can 
be scaled to the aggregate magnitudes for which data are available in the poor countries. 
 
Financial assets4 represent a sizable proportion of the aggregate non-human wealth of 
households—over 50 per cent in Norway (Jäntti and Sierminska 2006) and over 40 per 
cent in the US, even if we take the results of household surveys, which may 
disproportionately understate financial assets if compared to data from national balance 
sheets computed from national accounts sources (Davies et al. 2006). The share of 
financial assets in total wealth tends to increase with mean income. For Australia, 
Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden, the figure obtained from 
household surveys is about 30 per cent (Guiso et al. 2003; Jäntti and Sierminska 2006);5 
in China it is 22 per cent (Li and Zhao 2006), in Korea only 17 per cent (Yoo 2005) and 
in India about 4 per cent (NSSO 2005; Subramanian and Jayaraj 2006).  
 
Household financial liabilities also need to be considered for a rounded view; indeed, it 
would be very artificial to look only at the asset side when it comes to financial assets 
and liabilities, since both are endogenous and thought to be determined in large part by 
the same explanatory variables. In aggregate, household financial liabilities amount to 
as much as 30 per cent of gross household financial assets in the US, where consumer 
and household finance is very well developed. Indeed, for all but about the top decile of 
the  income distribution in that country, borrowing exceeds gross financial asset 
holdings. In other words, net financial assets for the lower 90 per cent are negative. The 
largest category of debt is mortgage and home equity debt, reflecting the fact that a 
homeowner’s residence can represent valuable collateral. Installment credit (mainly 
related to the purchase of automobiles and other household durables) and credit card 
debt are also used in rich countries, but amount to smaller sums.  
 
Borrowing possibilities for low-income households from formal intermediaries are more 
limited in less advanced economies. In these countries, middle class employee 
households may borrow unsecured, but often under arrangements whereby servicing 
charges are deducted from wage payments by the employer and remitted to the financial 
intermediary. 
                                                 
4 See Appendix 1 for a description of how financial assets are defined. 
5 The figure for Japan has been highly volatile in view of the housing boom and bust of the 1980s and 
1990s (Iwaisako 2003). 6 
1.1  Concentration of financial asset holdings  
Just as the share of financial assets in the total increases with mean income across 
countries, the distribution of financial wealth within advanced economies appears to be 
more concentrated than non-financial non-human (and than human wealth or income; 
see Figure 1 for the US data). This may be less true in developing countries. For 
example, Indian survey data suggest that the share of financial in non-human wealth is 
not monotonically increasing in wealth (Subramanian and Jayaraj 2006). The relatively 
undeveloped equity markets—limiting the availability of sophisticated financial claims 
on the local capital stock—the importance of landholding and the fact that most 
businesses are closely-held would be contributing factors to this difference. In China 
too, financial wealth as surveyed is not more concentrated than other wealth (Li and 
Zhao 2006), however China’s status as a transition economy must be taken into account 
in considering the relevance of this observation for other countries. Nevertheless, it is 
true for all countries that the bulk of financial assets is held by relatively wealthy 
households. Indeed, the bottom half of the wealth distribution in the USA holds no more 
 
Figure 1: Characteristics of the distribution of financial and other household asset 























Source: Based on data in Kennickell (2003). Example, (a) net worth of the top wealth decile exceeds 10 
times their income, (b) top decile holds 47 peer cent of its wealth in financial assets, (c) top decile holds 70 
percent of systemwide net worth. 
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US: Distribution of financial assets (and income)












































US: Wealth as a Multiple of Income












US: Allocation of net worth to different asset classes

















































than 3 per cent of the system’s financial assets. The same group holds about 4 per cent 
of the risk-free assets and 2 per cent of the risky assets.  
 
Given the fact that a much larger fraction of the population in poor countries holds no 
financial assets at all, and given that income is in most cases more unequally distributed 
in developing countries, it would seem likely that the share of financial assets held by 
the lower deciles would be even lower in the typical low- or middle-income country. In 
other words, concentration of financial asset ownership is surely even higher in poor 
countries. This conjecture is not, however, strongly confirmed by the available survey 
data. In India—where the data on risk-free financial assets includes cash holdings—the 
bottom half of the wealth distribution hold about 6 per cent of risk-free assets, and less 
than 3 per cent of risky assets (shares). For three other countries, Ghana, Jamaica and 
Vietnam (Figure 3), in the absence of wealth deciles, we calculated mean savings 
balances for expenditure/consumption deciles. One expects a higher percentage of total 
savings held by the bottom half of the expenditure decile than on the wealth decile, but 
the figures obtained are surprisingly high. The Ghana and Vietnam surveys respectively 
show 11 and 10 per cent of reported savings balances being held by the bottom half of 
the  expenditure distribution of the surveyed households.6 It may well be that these 
surveys do not capture the top end of the distribution as well as the specialized financial 
asset surveys for advanced economies, given that their purpose is not mainly to cover 
wealth issues. We prefer to discount these particular findings, and rely on the patterns 
observed more reliably in advanced economies to conclude that policy directed at 
mobilizing investable funds through the issue of financial assets can safely ignore the 
lower quartiles of the wealth distribution at least as far as the aggregate sums mobilized 
are concerned.7  
 
Taking account also of the net financial indebtedness of all but the highest income 
groups, it seems that the net provision of investable funds from the household to the 
business and government sectors depends essentially on the top decile of the income 
distribution—for the US, this group contributes 91 per cent of net household financial 
assets (as compared with 72 per cent of gross household financial assets).  
 
                                                 
6 For Jamaica, the figure is even higher at 35 per cent. However the Jamaica data is marred by a failure in 
the coding for these questions to distinguish between non-responding households and respondents who 
report zero balances. The percentage reporting positive balances actually declines from about 30 per cent 
in the middle quartiles of expenditure to 17 per cent for the top 5 per cent, strongly suggesting a sharp 
increase in non-response at the top of the income distribution for this country. 
7 That is not to say that banks will necessarily ignore the smaller depositor. Handling small deposits is 
costly, but potentially more profitable per dollar transacted. There is value at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ 
for intermediaries that can master the necessary cost efficiencies. But the volume of resources mobilized 
is negligible in terms of aggregate national intermediation. 8 
For advanced economies, the increased share of financial assets in total wealth is more a 
function of increased participation8 as we go up the income scale, more than an increase 
in the value of holdings conditional on participation. Interestingly, for Ghana a similar 
pattern appears for savings balances—the proportion of households reporting some 
savings balances does increase with income/expenditure, and the unconditional 
elasticity is about 1.8, but the ratio of savings balances to expenditure remains broadly 
constant conditional on reporting any holdings. However, in Vietnam, where very high 
participation is reported for all expenditure quartiles this is not true; the elasticity of 
savings balances to expenditures is about 1.7 for those households reporting some 
balances.9  
1.2  Households’ share of aggregate financial assets 
Wealthy households hold a sizable fraction of aggregate bank deposits. The household 
sector in aggregate holds more than 63 per cent of total deposits at financial 
intermediaries in the USA, and 80 per cent of deposits from non-financial non-
government domestic sectors.10 For the eurozone, comparable percentages are reported: 
60 per cent and 78 per cent respectively.11 Individuals hold 43 per cent of all resident 
deposits in the UK, a figure that rises to over two-thirds if deposits of financial 
institutions and public administration are excluded.12 Just over a half of the large 
deposit base of Chinese financial institutions is in the form of household savings 
deposits.13 In Egypt, households account for 78 per cent of total deposits.14 In the 
Eastern Caribbean Currency Union, household deposits are 60 per cent of the total, or 
68 per cent if financial and government deposits are excluded. In addition, households’ 
claims on managed funds, combined with their direct holdings, can be considered to 
finance a large share of traded equities in the more advanced economies.  
                                                 
8 By participation is meant whether or not holdings are non-zero. Fixed costs, including those of 
acquiring information, helps explain why households hold only a subset of available assets. King and 
Leape (1998) estimate a decision model incorporating such costs as well as non-negativity constraints on 
the US SCF data. 
9 The data for Jamaica is again out of synch; the elasticity here is below 0.7. 
10 Tables L204 and L205 of www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-4.pdf. The percentages 
include savings and time deposits as well as checking accounts and currency. 
11 Households accounted for €4.3 trillion of a total of domestic non-government deposits of €7.0 trillion 
in eurozone monetary financial intermediaries at end-2005. Non-government nonfinancial deposits 
amounted to €5.6 trillion (https://stats.ecb.int/stats/download/weas02_05/weas02_05/weas02_05.pdf).  
12 www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/abl/2005/dec/tableb.pdf. 
13 Including demand deposits and time deposits (www.pbc.cov.cn, Table: Sources and Uses of Credit 
Funds of Financial Institutions). 
14 www.cbe.org.eg/timeSeries.htm. 9 
1.3  Offshore assets and liabilities 
Although households, like other investors, tend to display a degree15 of home 
preference that discourages cross-border holdings of financial assets, nevertheless, 
reasons of political risk and tax avoidance can provide an important push in the opposite 
direction, resulting in capital flight and the holding of sizable and often covert offshore 
assets. Inevitably, it is difficult to measure the scale and pattern of this flight capital, but 
it is undoubtedly large (Hanson 2003 and references). Omission of offshore holdings 
will inevitably tarnish any analysis of household financial assets in developing countries.  
2  Household financial assets and growth 
Numerous econometric studies have established a causal link between financial depth 
and GDP growth.16 The indications are that it is through its influence on the 
productivity of investment, rather than on its magnitude, that bank intermediation exerts 
its pro-growth effect, at least in higher income economies. It is the aggregate stock of 
bank credit to private sector borrowers, rather than the aggregate stock of money, that 
has been found to be the most robust explanatory variable in these regression analyses. 
But without mobilized funds for onlending, the banks would not be able to increase the 
volume of credit. Given the importance of household asset accumulation in easing the 
challenge for local banks to mobilize funds for onlending, household financial asset 
holdings do make a potentially significant indirect contribution to growth.17 It needs to 
be underlined that this extra link in the chain (from money to credit) is not a very tight 
one. For example, banks in much of sub-Saharan Africa hold sizable excess reserves, 
either finding insufficient bankable lending opportunities to deploy the deposits which 
they have mobilized, or preferring to invest in high-yielding government securities in 
cases where domestic financing of government deficits in effect crowds out private 
lending; in this case additional household deposits are unlikely to be onlent. 
Furthermore, other countries have experienced the opposite phenomenon, where banks 
draw on external credit lines to finance more private lending than could be funded out 
of domestic resources—direct offshore borrowing by larger enterprises has also been 
observed in those cases. Nevertheless in broad terms (and in an echo of the Horioka-
Feldstein savings-investment correlation across countries), banking depth on the deposit 
and private credit side remain strongly correlated across countries, suggesting that there 
                                                 
15 Albeit diminishing, cf. Huizinga and Jonung (2005) 
16 The finance and growth literature is surveyed in detail by Levine (2005), and summarized more briefly 
by Honohan (2004a). There remains some doubt as to whether this effect is more important at low or 
intermediate levels of income, or of financial development (Rioja and Valev 2004; Aghion et al. 2005) 
17 The household dimension often not taken into account, so it is overall financial depth and not the 
household’s share that is considered in the literature on finance and growth. 10 
is a link even if it is not a rigid one (data for 138 countries are shown in Figure 4a: the 
correlation is +0.71).18 
 
If the poor have limited access to credit, might this imply that financial development is 
pro-rich, disproportionately benefiting the wealthy? Or is it for outsiders and 
newcomers that a well-developed financial system most provides opportunities in terms 
of smoothing consumption, diversifying risk and overcoming indivisibilities in 
investment. An interesting but rather rarified theoretical literature has explored a variety 
of channels through which financial development could affect the evolution of income 
distribution. Generally speaking, these models pivot on credit constraints and on such 
aspects as collateral as a prerequisite for credit, and by such considerations as the 
possibility that improvements in financial intermediation will be seized first by the 
already wealthy. There has been no professional consensus on which of the various 
models, with their mutually contradictory conclusions, is most likely to fit reality. 
Empirical evidence is accumulating, though, that financial development appears to be 
correlated not only with aggregate income growth, but also with lower poverty, even 
conditional on average income levels. Somewhat ironically, this seems to be the case 
more for financial depth indicators than for financial access indicators (see below).  
 
Li et al. (1998) were the first to look at this kind of issue in a cross-country econometric 
framework. They found that income inequality (Gini coefficient) was lower in cross-
sectional regressions with deeper financial systems. Honohan (2004a: 1-37) showed that 
absolute poverty (proportion of the population below the $1-a-day or $2-a-day poverty 
line) was lower in deeper financial systems, even conditional on the mean income level 
achieved by the non-rich, and these findings are confirmed on an updated and expanded 
data set in Table 2. Beck et al. (2004) looked at income growth rates of the poor and 
found that they were disproportionately high where financial intermediary development 
was deep. So there is a double effect on poverty—finance boosts mean income growth 
and it also promotes a more equal income distribution.19 
 
So far, this apparent pro-poor twist to financial depth remains something of a black box. 
It could reflect the mechanism proposed by Rajan and Zingales (2003), whereby a 
developed financial system is one where availability of credit undermines the economic 
power of incumbent elites, thereby generally diffusing development more widely and 
opening more opportunities. More household saving in financial assets fuels this credit 
availability and represents an important anti-poverty force. 
                                                 
18 The outliers are (a) countries with a large nonbank sector (like the US or Norway) funded with 
liabilities that are not included in the liquid liabilities definition used for the deposit side; (b) offshore 
financial centers (like Malta) holding sizable foreign assets; (c) Countries with relatively large lending by 
the banking system to the government (like Japan). 
19 These findings receive a nice confirmation from the results of Dehejia and Gatti (2005), who found a 
favourable cross-country effect of financial development on child labour. 11 
3  Does access to a bank account help reduce poverty? 
Casting our eyes to the bottom of the pyramid, we need to remind ourselves that, for 
lower income groups, it is not a question of how much financial assets they choose to 
hold, and even less a question of how much they choose to borrow from the financial 
system. These households encounter barriers to accessing financial services.20 In the 
advanced economies, this has led to a growing debate around the issue of financial 
exclusion. It is noted that a small but multiply deprived group—perhaps 10 per cent of 
the adult population—do not have access to financial services such as a transactions 
account, or even a savings account, much less a loan from a formal intermediary or an 
insurance policy. In some cases product features, such as a high minimum cover for an 
insurance product, or heavy penalties for unauthorized overdrafts (hard for poor people 
to avoid if they are using checking accounts), or having a fixed address as a prerequisite 
to open an account, represent material obstacles to use of such products. In other cases 
customers may be screened-out because of risk characteristics. Or rationalization of 
branches and service points may result in many poor customers having too far to travel 
to a branch to make an account worthwhile. Given the increasing extent to which full 
participation in economic life in the advanced economies depends on having an account 
at a financial intermediary, and given the material extra costs often imposed on non-
account holders, several countries have adopted policies in recent years to reduce 
financial exclusion (Porteous 2004; Carbo et al. 2005). 
 
In low- and middle-income countries, though, exclusion is normal for the bulk of the 
population, hence it becomes more natural to speak of broadening access to financial 
services rather than elimination of exclusion as the immediate goal. The exploding 
microfinance movement is driven by this motivation (Armendariz de Aghion and 
Morduch 2005; Honohan 2004b; Robinson 2001). Microfinance pioneers have 
emphasized the very high rates of return that can be earned by the poor and the near-
poor, especially in urban and peri-urban settings, resulting in a high demand for 
borrowings even at high interest rates. Some microfinance institutions work on a credit-
only basis, funding themselves from charitable donors and other sources; some employ 
forced savings elements to the loan scheme. The modern trend is to emphasize deposits 
as well as loans as key tool for efficient financial management, whether they represent 
precautionary savings, or a means of accumulating capital. Transactions accounts are 
also important for receiving and making internal and international remittances between 
family members. And micro insurance is beginning to be a significant element in the 
microfinance movement. 
 
                                                 
20 Including transactions services—an important dimension for such households which can be associated 
with the holding of balances in transactions accounts, but which will not be further discussed in this 
paper. 12 
Does access to financial services through deposit or loan accounts reduce poverty? 
Numerous anecdotes illustrate paths to relative prosperity being paved by such financial 
services. However, there is typically a large element of selection bias, both at the level 
of the individual client (with the more energetic likely to experience growing loan and 
deposit balances) and at the level of the village selected for establishment of a 
microfinance institution (sometimes this is a negative bias, as charitable sponsors seek 
out the more deprived villages). Furthermore, there can be displacement effects, with 
non-beneficiaries of microfinance suffering in local markets from the beneficiaries. 
Despite an extensive quasipromotional literature, detailed microeconometric analyses 
are, for these technical reasons, surprisingly non-committal about whether direct 
financial access has a major effect in reducing poverty (Honohan 2004b).  
 
What can be said at the macro level? Addressing this question evidently requires a 
cross-country data series on access. There are many dimensions to financial access, but 
to simplify matters, given the shortage of data, it is preferable to concentrate on one 
summary indicator. The most widely accepted indicator is the percentage of adults that 
have any type of account (including all types of transactions, savings or loan accounts) 
at a bank or other formal financial intermediary (World Bank 2005). How many people 
in developing countries have access to a bank or other formal financial intermediary 
account? This empirical question is the subject of vigorous current investigation. 
Piecing together elements from several other studies (especially Beck et al. 2005; 
Christen et al. 2004; Peachey and Roe 2006), Appendix 2 details the methodology of a 
new composite indicator available for over 150 countries (Table 1; Figure 5) and which 
has the merit of drawing on available data on the number of accounts in commercial 
banks, savings banks and various forms of microfinance institutions, and the average 
size of these accounts, as well as on the results of household surveys for the much more 
limited number of countries for which those are available.  
 
While recognizing the shortcomings of the imputation procedures used to construct the 
composite indicator, as well as the limitations (outlined in the appendix) of the 
underlying data sources, the resulting dataset is nevertheless interesting. Appropriate 
econometric techniques can limit the consequences of random error.  
 
Returning then to the question of whether financial access reduces poverty, we may use 
the new access data to obtain a macro cross-country perspective on this issue. Earlier 
work (using the CGAP data also described in Appendix 2) failed to find any significant 
cross-country correlation between the density of microfinance accounts and poverty 
rates (Honohan 2004b). But given the extensive differences between the old data and 
the new composite series, it is worth repeating the experiment. In fact (Table 2) using 
any of the variants of the new data series presented in Appendix 2, we do find that 
access is correlated with poverty rates. This is true even of the microfinance-only data 
(referred to in the Appendix as the WSBI series—see regression 2.D). It is also true of 
the synthetic access percentages (2.E) or the composite series (2.F). But access 13 
percentages are, of course, strongly correlated with per capita income (Figure 6),21 and 
since the latter is highly correlated with poverty rates, the more interesting question is 
whether access remains significant in a regression which also includes per capita 
income. In fact, when per capita income and other controls found to be significant in 
earlier work (see 2.A-C) are added to the specification, none of the access series retains 
significance (2.G). 
 
Given the numerous deficiencies of the aggregate access data series, these negative 
macro cross-country results should not be taken as proving that access has little effect, 
but neither do they provide any strong evidence in favour of that hypothesis. Besides, 
the equation is clearly under-specified, the omission of relevant variables could mask or 
bias the estimated role of access. For instance, access might be more effective in the 
presence of other elements of the financial infrastructure such as credit registries or 
effective protection of property rights (Johnson et al. 2002; Djankov et al. 2006), or if 
financial liberalization is more advanced (Waldenström and Vlachos 2005). The 
strength and presence of informal credit channels could also be a factor. Several other 
control variables reflecting for example education and labour market conditions deserve 
to be included also. Future work will report the results of further analysis along these 
lines. 
 
                                                 
21 In a regression of data on the summary access indicator for 147 countries, per capita income explains 
60 per cent of cross country variation. After exclusion of six outliers, Hong Kong, Lebanon, Luxembourg, 
Macao, China and United Arab Emirates, this jumps to 73 per cent. It is likely that these six outliers 
should be omitted from most analyses with this data. 14 
Table 1: Composite measure of access to financial services 
Albania  b ALB  34   Germany  s DEU  97   Panama    PAN  46 
Algeria   DZA  31    Ghana   GHA 16   Papua  New  Guinea  b  PNG  8 
Angola   AGO  35    Greece  s  GRC 83   Paraguay   PRY  30 
Antigua  &  Barbuda  ATG  48    Grenada   GRD 37   Peru   PER  26 
Argentina  b ARG 28   Guatemala  s GTM  32   Philippines    PHL  26 
Armenia  s ARM 9   Guinea    GIN  20   Poland  s POL  66 
Austria  s AUT  96   Guyana  s GUY  14   Portugal  s PRT  84 
Azerbaijan   AZE 17    Haiti   HTI  15   Romania   ROM  23 
Bahamas,  The   BHS  53    Honduras  B  HND 25   Russian  Federation   RUS  69 
Bangladesh    BGD  32    Hong Kong, Chn    HKG  [38]    Rwanda    RWA  23 
Barbados   BRB  56    Hungary  S  HUN 66   Samoa   WSM  19 
Belarus   BLR 16    India   IND  48   Saudi  Arabia   SAU  62 
Belgium  s  BEL  97    Indonesia    IDN  40    Sao Tome & Principe    STP  15 
Belize   BLZ 46    Iran,  Isl.  Rep.   IRN  31   Senegal   SEN  27 
Benin   BEN  32    Iraq   IRQ  17   Seychelles   SYC  41 
Bermuda   BMU  48    Ireland  s  IRL  88   Sierra  Leone   SLE  13 
Bhutan   BTN  16    Italy  s  ITA  75   Singapore  b  SGP  98 
Bolivia   BOL  44    Jamaica   JAM  59   Slovak  Republic   SVK  83 
Bosnia  &  Herzeg.   BIH 17    Jordan  b  JOR  37   Slovenia   SVN  97 
Botswana   BWA  47    Kazakhstan   KAZ  48   Solomon  Islands   SLB  15 
Brazil  s BRA 43   Kenya  s KEN  10   South  Africa    ZAF  46 
Bulgaria  s BGR 56   Korea,  Rep.    KOR  63   Spain  s ESP  95 
Burkina Faso    BFA  26    Kyrgyz Republic    KGZ  1    Sri Lanka    LKA  66 
Burundi    BDI  17    Latvia    LVA  64    St. Kitts and Nevis    KNA  49 
Cambodia    KHM 20   Lebanon  b LBN  [79]  St.  Lucia    LCA  40 
Cameroon    CMR  24    Lesotho    LSO  17    St. Vincent & Gren.    VCT  45 
Cape  Verde   CPV  52    Liberia   LBR  11   Sudan   SDN  15 
Cent  African  Rep.   CAF  19    Libya   LBY  27   Suriname   SUR  32 
Chile   CHL  60    Lithuania  s  LTU  70   Swaziland   SWZ  35 
China   CHN  42    Luxembourg  s  LUX  99   Sweden  s  SWE  99 
Colombia  s COL 41   Macao,  China    MAC  [14]  Switzerland  b CHE  88 
Comoros   COM  20    Macedonia,  FYR  MKD 20   Syrian  A.R.   SYR  17 
Congo,  Rep.   COG  27    Madagascar   MDG 21   Tajikistan   TJK  16 
Costa  Rica   CRI 29    Malawi   MWI 21   Tanzania   TZA  5 
Cote  d'Ivoire   CIV 25    Malaysia  b  MYS 57   Thailand   THA  59 
Croatia   HRV  42    Mali   MLI  21   Timor-Leste   TMP  13 
Cuba   CUB  45    Malta  s  MLT  90   Togo   TGO  28 
Cyprus  s CYP 85   Mauritania    MRT  16   Trinidad  &  Tobago    TTO  53 
Czech  Republic  s CZE  85   Mauritius  b MUS  60   Tunisia    TUN  42 
Denmark  s DNK 99   Mexico  s MEX  25   Turkey  b TUR  49 
Dominica   DMA  66    Moldova   MDA 13   Uganda   UGA  20 
Dominican  Rep.   DOM  29    Mongolia   MNG 30   Ukraine   UKR  24 
Ecuador  s ECU 35   Morocco    MAR  39   United  Arab  Emirates b ARE  [33] 
Egypt   EGY  41    Mozambique   MOZ 12   United  Kingdom  s  GBR  91 
El  Salvador   SLV 26    Myanmar   MMR 19   United  States  s  USA  91 
Eritrea   ERI 12    Namibia  s  NAM 28   Uruguay   URY  42 
Estonia  s EST  86   Nepal    NPL  20   Uzbekistan    UZB  16 
Ethiopia    ETH  14   Netherlands    NLD  100  Venezuela  b VEN  28 15 
Fiji  b FJI  39   Nicaragua  s NIC  5   Vietnam    VNM  29 
Finland  s  FIN  99    Niger    NER  31    West Bank & Gaza    WBG  14 
France  s FRA  96   Nigeria    NGA  15   Yemen,  Rep.    YEM  14 
Gabon   GAB  39    Norway  b  NOR 84   Yugoslavia,  FR     YUG  21 
Gambia   GMB  21    Oman   OMN 33   Zambia   ZMB  15 
Georgia   GEO  15    Pakistan  b  PAK  12   Zimbabwe  b  ZWE  34 
Note: ‘s’ means household survey data used; ‘b’ means fitted data using bank deposit numbers and not 
WSBI numbers. [Square bracketed data are considered less reliable]. This is Mark IIc version of the data 
series: As more refined information on specific countries is obtained, it is envisaged that this series will be 
updated.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on Beck et al. (2005), Christen et al (2004), Claessens (2005), 
European Commission (2005), Peachey and Roe (2006). For definitions and method see Appendix 2. 
4  Allocation between different assets 
Turning to the composition of the household financial portfolio, one distinctive stylized 
fact is that the rich hold a much riskier financial asset portfolio.22 In making this 
judgment, we rely on the conventional classification that treats bank deposits (and other 
liquid assets largely free of default risk such as mutual funds solely invested in short-
term money market assets and certain government-sponsored savings schemes) as 
largely risk-free.23 US data (Figure 1) suggests that these display a wealth elasticity of 
close to unity.24 Though subject to market risk, government bonds are also often 
classified with the risk-free; lower wealth deciles do not hold much of these, but even 
when they are included with the other risk-free assets, this broader category still 
displays a wealth elasticity little more than unity (constant share of wealth held in this 
form). Up to a certain level,25 other risky financial assets have a wealth elasticity much 
higher than unity—this reflects the declining share of total wealth held in non-financial 
form as wealth increases. Extrapolating these observations to conditions in low-income 
countries, the share of risky financial assets in the national totals is likely to be smaller 
in poor countries. This indeed is confirmed by the observation that the ratio of aggregate 
national bank deposits to market capitalization is negatively correlated with per capita 
income—though the correlation is rather weak when attention when data is restricted to 
developing countries, because of outliers such as Israel, Jamaica and Slovenia (Figure 
4b).  
                                                 
22 Carroll (2002) has shown that a strong bequest motive could explain not only higher savings rates for 
high income households but also a higher risk-tolerance. Carroll also notes that rich households hold a 
relatively high share of non-financial business equity. He suggests that this is due to capital market 
imperfections inducing owners of technology or other productive assets to invest in their own enterprises 
An alternative explanation is that true total Haig-Simon income from non-financial wealth is higher than 
measured. After all, what is wealth but capitalized Haig-Simon income?   
23 Even though subject to inflation risk as well as (in less advanced economies) a small but sometimes 
not insignificant default risk. 
24 Inferred from data on asset multiples of income for deciles of wealth in Kennickell (2003). 
25 To about the 90
th decile of wealth in the US data: non-financial business equity assets represent an 
increasing share of the portfolios of the very rich. 16 
The pattern of increasing risk as wealth increases appears to be driven mainly by higher 
participation by rich households in the riskier assets. In other words, a higher proportion 
of wealthy households hold risky financial assets, but among households with financial 
assets there is relatively little systematic variation in the ratio of risky financial assets to 
other assets as wealth increases. This can be seen in Figure 2 for six advanced 
economies (based on Guiso et al. 2002, compare their Tables 1.5 and 1.7), and for 
Korea. If this can be extrapolated to low-income countries, then it implies that patterns 
of ownership can be inferred from participation rates for different assets and products. 
Participation data for risky financial assets are available for India (Kar et al. 2003) and it 
also shows a strong upward trend with income (Figure 2). Conditional on some holdings 
of risky assets, the share of risk in total financial assets rises slightly with income in 
China. It seems safe to assume that the unconditional share of risky assets increases 
with wealth in both China and India. Note that participation rates are much lower for all 
quintiles in India than for the advanced economies shown—as is surely the case in all 
developing countries. But is household portfolio allocation efficient? There are various 
reasons to suppose that it is not. For instance, it is hard to rationalize the lack of 
diversification in most household portfolios.26 The existence of an equity premium has 
contributed to a perception that risky assets form too low a share in household 
portfolios. Other kinds of portfolio allocation error are also conjectured, such as reliance 
on fixed-interest mortgages when choice of floating might place the household on a 
higher indifference curve. Reviewing this literature for the US, Campbell (2006) 
concludes that ‘many households are reasonably effective investors, but a minority 
make significant mistakes,’ and that there may be a persistent cross-subsidy from naïve 
to sophisticated households. 
                                                 
26 For example, Kelly (1995) showed that the median US investor held just one equity stock.. More 
recently, Goetzmann and Kumar (2005) showed that, while diversification is increasing among the clients 
of a large US brokerage, many are still demonstrably insufficiently diversified and forgo substantial 
returns on a risk-adjusted basis, even after allowing for transactions costs. Bergstresser and Poterba 
(2004) discuss tax inefficient portfolio allocation by US households. 17 
Table 2: Poverty and financial access 
Equation: 2.A  2.B 2.C 2.D 2.E 2.F 2.G   
 Coeff.  t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat 
Constant 173.6  **11.6 170.6 **12.8 137.8 **8.5 31.4 **6.7 94.5 **6.1 61.1 **5.7 140.0 **8.5 
GNI per cap (log)  -18.8  **10.4   
GNI per cap lower 90% (log)    -19.2 **11.4 -17.5 **10.4 23.4  **8.8 
Share of top 10%    0.574 **3.3 0.948  **3.1 
Access (log)    -4.4 **2.7 -22.1 **4.8 -12.4 **3.9 -2.0  0.8 
Which measure?    WSBI Synth Comp Comp   
R-squared / NOBS  0.546  91 0.598 89 0.643 89 0.079 88 0.212 88 0.151 89 0.645 87 
Adjusted R-squared  0.541  0.593 0.634 0.068 0.203 0.141 0.632  
S.E. of regression  15.2  14.2 13.5 21.9 20.3 21.0 13.7  
Log likelihood  -375.7  -361.5 -356.2 -395.5 -388.7 -396.2 -348.8   
Note: This table shows regressions relating the $1 per day poverty percentage to financial access percentages across countries. ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% 
levels, respectively. Cross section: all available countries: Note GNI per cap is measured at PPP ; WSBI is the data in Peachey and Roe (2006); Synth(etic) is the predicted 
share using the estimated regression J in Table A1; Comp(osite) is based on household survey data where available, otherwise Synth (see Appendix 2—Mark IIa of the 
composite series was used here). 
Source for poverty and inequality measures: GPID; source for GNI: WDI. 
Table 3: Use of different financial products, EU countries, 2005, % 






























EU25 median    90 73  30 29 35 30 7 12 18 9 8 6 6 8 2 9 1 78
EU25 mean    89 71  34 30 30 28 25 19 17 16 10 10 7 7 5 10 1 80
Belgium BE  97 93  43 68 38 64 6 27 27 25 17 14 9 4 7 1 2 95
Denmark DK  99 47  48 26 39 59 20 43 44 40 29 8 16 17 19 1 0 62
Germany DE  97 92  23 41 40 28 6 24 19 9 11 16 7 8 5 2 1 94
Greece EL 83 10  26 59 15 28 2 2 5 8 4 2 5 5 1 17 0 65
Spain ES  95 50  36 54 18 30 8 3 11 19 6 5 7 3 1 4 1 8918 
France FR 96 87  62 21 35 10 75 38 11 23 8 10 10 8 2 2 2 89
Ireland IE  88 57  40 36 36 42 29 16 19 22 10 4 23 12 5 11 1 72
Italy IT  75 62  20 9 10 6 24 4 4 6 6 6 3 3 4 24 1 70
Luxembourg LU  99 74  65 29 38 59 9 39 18 25 18 16 17 11 6 1 0 85
Netherlands NL  100 95  43 30 45 65 7 4 26 49 21 23 3 3 7 0 0 96
Austria AT 96 73  28 56 39 61 5 31 25 5 7 6 9 11 4 2 2 84
Portugal PT  84 74  20 12 21 43 35 4 6 10 4 1 4 3 2 14 2 77
Finland FI  99 82  42 31 22 39 1 8 11 23 17 14 13 11 2 1 0 87
Sweden SE  99 75  64 50 54 51 9 18 49 49 39 57 16 12 14 1 0 85
UK UK  91 76  51 37 40 50 64 38 31 30 19 9 10 14 10 7 2 83
Cyprus CY 85 46  34 40 33 8 28 12 2 13 19 0 17 18 2 14 1 71
Czech Rep.   CZ  85 73  14 14 36 16 0 20 30 5 3 3 6 9 1 14 1 79
Estonia EE 86 74  20 15 16 25 1 4 31 4 4 1 3 8 0 11 3 78
Hungary HU  66 49  10 9 24 12 1 12 20 3 1 1 6 3 1 33 1 54
Latvia LV  64 29  29 7 10 26 2 10 11 5 2 0 3 9 1 35 1 32
Lithuania LT  70 42  14 9 9 30 1 1 15 0 2 1 1 5 0 25 5 47
Malta MT  90 53  30 46 26 69 32 6 7 9 13 6 5 3 9 9 1 75
Poland PL 66 46  14 8 26 5 3 12 9 2 2 2 3 6 2 32 2 49
Slovakia SK  83 62  13 20 37 7 2 8 18 4 3 3 5 7 2 17 0 74
Slovenia SI  97 87  35 8 37 56 9 40 8 1 24 8 6 10 2 3 0 90
Predicted @ 50% access  50  21 18 22 22 10 11 14 6 5 2 5 7 2
Predicted @ 100% access  78  44 40 49 38 24 20 23 25 18 15 11 10 7
Note: ‘Access’ means reporting at least one product. Source: Eurobarometer 230 (and special tabulation), European Commission (2005); and author’s calculations.  19 
























Source: Based on data in Guiso et al. (2002); Kar et al. (2001); for China, special tabulations by Ding Sai based on CASS 2002 survey (Li and Zhao 2006); for Korea special 
tabulations by JaeChil Kim of KSRI based on the Korea Household Income and Expenditure Survey of the National Statistics Bureau. Note for India and Korea the quartiles are 
income, not wealth. 
Participation in risky financial assets by age



















Participation in risky financial assets by wealth






















Share of risky assets in gross financial wealth by wealth quartile



















Share of risky financial assets in total wealth by age











































Source: Author’s tabulations based on Ghana LSMS 1999. 






























































































































Ghana: Distribution of financial assets
































































Source: Author’s tabulations based on Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS), 1997-98. 













































































Vietnam: Distribution of financial assets






























































Source: Author’s tabulations based on Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions 2004. 
 










































Jamaica: Distribution of financial assets







































Figure 4a: Strong correlation between credit and deposit measures of financial depth: 
private credit and liquid liabilities expressed as a multiple of GDP 
Financial depth measures: 


































Source: World Bank Financial Structure Database. 
Figure 4b: Financial Structure and Per Capita Income, Developing Countries 2003: 
Ratio of stock market capitalization to liquid liabilities of the banking system plotted 
against per capita GNI 
Source: World Bank Financial Structure Database. 
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Note: Percentage of adult population with access to an account. Shows mean, median, max and min 
values for countries in each region. The median is higher than the mean LAC and MNA, mean is higher 
than median elsewhere. ECA excludes EU member states.  
Source: As for Figure A1. 
Figure 6: Access and per capita income, 160 countries 












0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000

























Note: This uses the composite access indicator—for definition see Appendix 2. GNI per capita data from 
WDI. The three outliers on the lower right hand side are Hong Kong, China; Macao, China; and United 
Arab Emirates. 
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Figure 7: Access to finance and per capita GDP, 25 EU countries 
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Source: Access based on Eurobarometer 230 (European Commission 2005). Access percentages are 100 
less the percentage reporting none of 14 listed financial products, less the percentage reporting ‘don’t 
know’. GDP per capita measured in thousands of Euro, source Eurostat. 





































































































































































































Note: The figure shows the median and mean usage percentages across EU member states of the 
different products listed in Table 3, together with the fitted percentages from the regression reported in 
Table 4 for 50 per cent and 100 per cent basic access. 26 
Various explanations have been advanced for deviations from household portfolio 
efficiency, including inadequate financial education,27 weak investor protection28 and 
lack of trust (Guiso et al. 2005).29 These issues have been little considered in the 
developing country context, and the limited data on age and education patterns are only 
moderately informative here. In practice, the use of non-cash financial assets is highly 
correlated with education levels in China, Ghana and Vietnam (but education in turn is 
correlated with income).30 In addition to advocating a more adventurous portfolio, 
financial planners often recommend that the riskiness of the household portfolio should 
decline as households near retirement—a form of turnpike theorem for investment 
planning. Looking therefore at variations in the share of risky assets with age, no strong 
pattern emerges consistently across countries for which data is available. There is a 
hump-shaped pattern—as would be recommended by financial planners—for the US, 
the UK and Germany (Figure 2), but a trend increase for the Netherlands and (at least as 
far as participation is concerned) for India. The reduced share of risky assets held by 
older people in the US is less than would be recommended by financial planners 
(Ameriks and Zeldes 2004).31 There is no pronounced age-risk correlation for any of 
the developing countries for which we have data. Given that different age groups also 
represent different cohorts in these data, however, there is an identification problem in 
separating the effects of calendar time and age. 
 
Supply conditions can also strongly affect household portfolio composition in 
developing countries including the choice between risky and safe assets, especially, but 
not only, when exchange controls limit international diversification. Legal, regulatory 
and tax policies can strongly affect the cost and availability to lower income households 
of such products as insurance and mortgage finance. Equity is the prime risk product, 
and availability of traded equity has been greatly increased in many developing 
countries through privatization. This process has been enormously influential in 
increasing participation in equity markets (Boutchkova and Megginson 2000), even 
though the voucher-based experiments towards popular capitalism in Eastern Europe 
were quite problematical (Ellerman 2001). In turn the political commitment, which 
                                                 
27 Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) found astonishing levels of financial ignorance when they added a 
module on financial education to a 2004 US survey on health and retirement issues. 
28 Giannetti and Koskinen (2004) present data for 26, mostly advanced, economies on the percentage of 
households holding equities; they find a positive correlation between these percentages and measures of 
investor protection. 
29 Rosen and Wu (2004) show that households with poor health status hold less risky assets. 
30 See Figure 3 for Ghana and Vietnam. For urban households in China, the share holding risky assets 
increases monotonically with education categories from 0.1% of those with below primary level to over 
10% for those with post-graduate qualifications (CASS survey special tabulations). 
31 However, as Ameriks and Zeldes show (2004), the apparent downward trend with old age is not 
confirmed by a more thorough multivariate microeconometric analysis of the US data—an observation 
which should act as a caveat for conclusions based on the simpler univariate approach adopted here. 27 
privatization to domestic households can represent, lowers political risk and increases 
stock market valuations which in turn can favourably affect growth (Oijen and Perotti 
2001). Moving beyond the risky/safe dichotomy, available data is not only limited but 
hard to bring to a common base, given the different types of financial asset and financial 
product and the different ways in which information about holdings has been measured 
in different countries. One large cross-country database that avoids these difficulties is 
that assembled in recent years for the 25 member states of the EU (EU), which now 
includes some middle-income countries.32  
Table 4: Analysis of product semi-elasticities with respect to overall access 
 constant access t-stat RSQ
Checking a/c  0.78 0.96 3.9 0.40
Credit card  0.44 0.79 4.4 0.46
Deposit a/c  0.40 0.77 3.4 0.33
Debit card  0.49 0.94 3.8 0.39
Life assurance  0.38 0.57 4.2 0.43
Overdraft 0.24 0.48 2.6 0.23
Checkbook 0.20 0.30 1.1 0.05
Occupational pension  0.23 0.32 1.9 0.13
Mortgage 0.25 0.64 3.8 0.38
Shares 0.18 0.47 4.3 0.45
Collective investments  0.15 0.43 2.9 0.27
Car loan over 1 year  0.11 0.20 2.7 0.24
Other loan over 1 year  0.10 0.10 1.6 0.10
Bonds 0.07 0.16 2.6 0.23
Note: The table shows the estimated intercept and coefficient on log(access) in a regression of the 
percentages using each product across the EU25. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the data in Table 3. 
 
The pattern of usage of different financial products found in the EU data (Table 3) 
suggests a fairly clear pecking order for some products, in that there is a fairly regular 
progression in the use of these products as overall financial access increases. (Here 
overall financial access is measured by the percentage of respondents who report use 
any of the products). By regressing for each product the percentage using that product 
                                                 
32 The European Commission have conducted financial surveys in member states almost every year since 
the late 1990s. The objective of the survey includes analysis of satisfaction with products, confidence in 
intermediaries and the effectiveness of cross-border competition. The data discussed here were collected 
in 2005 and reported in European Commission (2005). Thanks to Francesco Gaetano for the special 
tabulation in the final column of Table 3 showing usage of either checking or deposit account; also 
plotted in Figure 7. The European Commission stresses however, that the Eurobarometer survey was 
designed to elicit attitudes about the importance of various financial issues rather than measuring usage, 
therefore the statistics on usage should therefore be treated with caution. In particular, they caution that 
‘the given response rate should not be misinterpreted as implying that the remaining proportion of 
respondents do not have the corresponding item’. 28 
on (the log of) overall financial access, we can estimate how sensitive each product is to 
overall usage. The results are summarized in Table 4 and Figure 8. The intercept 
represents the estimated usage for a country where there is 100 per cent access.33 At 
that point, checking account usage is projected at 78 per cent,34 and holdings of bonds 
at 7 per cent. Projected usage at 50 per cent access is also shown in Table 4. Checking 
and deposit accounts and their associated cards are in the first rank for usage. Life 
assurance comes next, followed at some distance by the various loans and more 
complex investment instruments. Check-book, overdraft and occupational pensions 
have much higher variance of usage, little of which can be explained by variations in 
overall access: instead these should be seen as system-specific rather than generic 
products. 
5 Concluding  remarks 
Financial asset holdings by households are highly concentrated; in the US one-half of 
households own about 97 per cent of financial assets. The savings they represent are 
pooled and transformed by financial intermediaries and markets, enhancing their risk 
and return. Although firms are also providers of funds to intermediaries and markets, 
the savings of prosperous households ultimately represent a large fraction of the 
resources employed by the financial sector in its provision of risk-reduction services 
and investable funds. As such, they are a key ingredient in the growth-promoting 
process of financial intermediation.  
 
Data on the financial asset holdings of households in developing countries are very 
sparse indeed. The quality of data for the handful of countries for which systematic 
surveys have been conducted is suspect, with indications that asset holdings of the 
highest income groups are systematically understated. For low-income countries, the 
relevant question for poor households is not how much financial assets they have, but 
whether they have access to financial intermediaries at all. We have drawn on and 
synthesized recent work by several authors using information provided by banks and 
microfinance institutions in combination with household survey data to produce 
estimates of access percentages for almost 150 countries. These estimates can be 
progressively refined as the results of a new wave of access surveys currently under way 
or planned become available. 
 
                                                 
33 When a country reaches 100 per cent access, usage of products may continue to grow—attempts to 
deal with this by adding a term in per capita GDP does not prove to yield precisely estimated coefficients 
on this rather small dataset. 
34 Checking accounts and deposit accounts appear to be substitutes in the sense that inclusion of the 
percentage using deposit accounts results in a much improved fit; the estimated coefficient on deposit 
account usage is –0.52. No other substitutes were found in the data. 29 
The new access percentages are negatively correlated across countries with poverty 
rates, but the correlation is not a robust one and loses significance in multiple 
regressions that include mean per capita income. Thus the supposed anti-poverty 
potential of financial access remains econometrically elusive. Data for developing 
countries is insufficiently rich to assess whether asset choice by households is consistent 
with rational choice, a question on which there has been much discussion for advanced 
economies. Once again, it is more a question of whether households actually use any of 
a range of different types of financial instruments, than of whether they have chosen the 
optimal quantities of each in their portfolio. Analysis of data from the EU-25 suggests a 
ranking of different financial instruments and products in terms of the level of income at 
which each will be widely used—checking and deposit accounts and their associated 
cards come first, followed by life assurance and then loans. 30 
Appendix 1: A few definitions 
As the paper concentrates exclusively on financial assets, it is desirable to clarify what 
is included and what excluded by this convention.  
 
Financial assets represent contractual claims on other agents and are as such 
differentiated from other physical or tangible assets such as land, buildings and 
machinery. While the value of a financial asset may be considered to derive from the 
wealth of the issuer, attempts to trace the value of a financial asset through a sequence 
of such claims to an underlying nonfinancial asset are in practice blurred and dissolved 
by the pooling of claims through intermediaries and by the contingent nature of such 
derived claims.   
 
Financial assets include cash (notes and coin), deposits at banks and other 
intermediaries, tradable equities, government and corporate bonds, and holdings of 
managed funds. A wide range of variants and derivatives of these basic financial assets 
are also included, and these have become increasingly important in advanced 
economies. The three main areas of ambiguity in drawing the line between financial and 
non-financial assets are in the area of insurance, pensions and equities.  
 
For statistical purposes, the only insurance claims that are customarily measured as 
financial assets are life assurance policies, and they are included only to the extent of 
their surrender (cash) value. This may substantially under-represent the discounted 
present value of the expected benefits from the policy.   
 
As to pension and retirement fund claims, the market value of defined contribution 
funds are generally treated as a financial asset, but the value of occupational defined 
benefit funds and any expectation of social security or social assistance pensions 
typically is not, at least partly because of difficulties of measurement. 
 
For equities, only those that are freely tradable (and thus excluding ownership claims on 
enterprises that have not adopted the procedures for public tradability of their equities) 
are included as financial assets. The idea here is that a share in a privately-owned 
company is quite close to direct ownership of part of the company’s assets and as such 
ought to be excluded. A difficulty here is that many listed companies are controlled by a 
small group of shareholders—perhaps a family—either through a majority stake, or a 
sufficiently large minority stake, perhaps involving a pyramidal structure of ownership. 
While these insider stakes will normally be treated as financial assets, given that 
identical holdings by non-controlling shareholders are clearly financial assets, the 
degree of control over the assets of the company which they represent is close to being 
non-financial in nature. Of these three frontier categories, pension and equity holdings 
are among the most rapidly evolving asset classes, and have been the subject of far-
reaching policy initiatives in many countries related in particular to changing longevity 
and privatization of public enterprises. 31 
Appendix 2: A new composite series on household access to financial services 
This Appendix discusses some recent contributions to measuring access of households 
to various forms of intermediary accounts, and proposed a new composite cross-country 
indicator of the percentage of the adult population with access to some intermediary 
account. The new series has the advantage of wide coverage—almost 140 countries—
and the drawback of relying for many countries on some rather shaky imputations.  
 
In recent contributions, two basic approaches have been used to get to grips with the 
problem of measuring overall financial access (Honohan 2005). One is to go directly to 
households and survey their usage, whether as part of a wider household survey or a 
dedicated financial access survey. The other is to make inferences from data in the 
number of intermediary accounts. The annex proposes a method of using overlaps 
between the country coverage of the different approaches to arrive at access estimates 
for 162 countries—or almost three times the number of countries for which there is 
direct household survey data. 
 
The first method of measuring access, namely the use of sample surveys of households 
or individuals, is the most satisfactory from a conceptual point of view. The surveys that 
have produced data here include general household surveys such as the LSMS series 
(which can include a savings module asking questions about the holding of savings) and 
specialized financial access surveys, such as the Finscope series which began in 
Southern Africa and are currently being rolled out in several other African countries. 
The series of Eurobarometer surveys in the EU also ask such questions (cf. European 
Commission, 2005). Unfortunately the number of countries covered by household 
survey data remains modest, and there are indications of problems with the reliability 
some of the data collected.35   
 
The second method is to collect data on the number of accounts maintained at the 
financial institutions. This has been done in respect of microfinance in 148 developing 
countries by Christen et al. (2004) of CGAP, building on earlier compilations for more 
limited groupings. They include not only specialized microfinance institutions, savings 
and credit cooperatives, credit unions and other socially-oriented intermediaries 
(including some microfinance-oriented commercial banks) and they term these 
‘alternative’ intermediaries.36 More recently, Peachey and Roe (2006) have augmented 
the CGAP database with figures for a number of additional savings banks (members of 
the World Savings Banks Institute), which had not been included by Christen et al. We 
                                                 
35 The Eurobarometer surveys have been repeated on a roughly annual frequency with some startling 
year-to-year jumps in the responses, despite only small change in the questions answered.  
36 Christen et al. (2004) define their coverage as including intermediaries that have a ‘double bottom-
line’, reflecting social (access to finance) as well as strictly commercial objectives. They include 
government-owned development banks and savings banks. 32 
describe this augmented set as the ‘WSBI database’. The additions are important. Many 
of the institutions added by Peachey and Roe, most of them postal savings banks, have 
very wide outreach by national standards: in 27 countries they represent more than 50 
per cent of the number of accounts recorded. Furthermore, the additional banks include 
two very large ones (the Industrial and Commercial Bank, ICBC, of China and 
Sberbank, Russia, with 0.43 and 0.23 billion accounts respectively); their inclusion 
accounts for the fact that the augmented dataset contains more than twice as many 
accounts—1.46 billion instead of 0.67 billion—thereby sharply revising aggregate 
access estimates. 
 
Figure A1 presents the distribution across countries of number of microfinance accounts 
per 100 adult population using the WSBI series. It also shows the same for microfinance 
accounts that are not savings bank accounts (based on the CGAP numbers). It suggests a 
rather better access picture than indicated in earlier work, and in particular shows that 
ignoring the large government-sponsored savings banks leads to a considerable 
understatement of the  number of bank accounts (though it should be noted that many of 
these savings banks do not offer credit services to individual customers). 
 
A parallel exercise for banks was conducted mainly through a survey of banking 
regulators (Beck et al. 2005). Data on the number of deposits at 1999-2000 was 
obtained for 45 countries—35 of them developing countries. However, this survey 
covers only those institutions regarded as ‘deposit money banks’ and as such does not 
cover most microfinance institutions. 
 
A number of difficulties arises in moving from these two databases to a reliable 
indicator of the proportion of households with financial access. For one thing, there is 
unfortunately an overlap between the coverage of the two databases on numbers of 
accounts, as some commercial banks are included in the WSBI sample, and elimination 
of this overlap has not yet proved feasible. Then again there is the problem of inferring 
the number of distinct and active accountholders from data on numbers of accounts, as 
many individuals have multiple accounts. On the other hand, some accounts are 
recorded even though they have long been inactive. There is sure to be a large variation 
from country to country and between different types of banks in the degree to which 
these problems result in the aggregate number of accounts exceeding the number of 
individuals with accounts. The typical individual in more advanced financial systems 
likely holds a greater number of accounts than in less advanced economies. And there 
are widely differing practices with regard to multiple accounts. For example, the 
ICBC—with the largest number of individual accounts of any bank, is currently 
carrying out a campaign to consolidate multiple accounts.37  
                                                 
37 Interestingly, the bank’s notice to customers dated October 18, 2005, urging them to close or merge 
accounts containing small balances, identifies no fewer than 11 classes of account which should not be 
closed.  33 
There are other loose ends. For instance, while the accounts at ICBC are included in the 
WSBI data, the 146 million active personal deposit accounts at another large Chinese 
institution, the China Commercial Bank are not, essentially because it is not a member 
of the WSBI. Both of these banks would be included in the concept of ‘commercial 
banks’ employed by Beck et al. (2005) for their survey, though data for China has not 
been included in that survey.38 
















Note: The four series shown are: (i) based on the CGAP data for ‘alternative’ financial intermediaries; (ii) 
based on the expanded WSBI data including additional savings banks; (iii) the Synthetic series based on 
regression J in Table 1; (iv) the Composite series which substitutes actual household survey data for the 
synthetic series where available. Example: 70 per cent of 138 developing countries in the database have 
at least 41.2 accounts per 100 adult population according to the Composite series. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Regression J table A1; underlying data drawn from: Beck et al. 
(2005); Christen et al. (2004); Claessens (2005), European Commission (2005) (Household Survey); 
Peachey and Roe (2006). 
 
Given these numerous difficulties it is heartening to discover that data on bank account 
numbers and on average bank account size (as a proportion of GDP) are quite closely 
correlated with household survey-based data on access percentages (Table A1, 
regressions A and B; and Figure A1). The log-linear relationship is close enough to 
suggest using extrapolating fitted values for countries in which there is no household 
survey data available. Using the bank account database, this allows synthetic access 
percentages to be derived for about 45 countries. Even more encouraging, for countries 
where both exist, the bank account numbers are quite highly correlated with—though 
not equal to—the WSBI numbers (Table A1, regression L). Thus, where the number of 
                                                 
38 The household survey percentages used here are drawn from the compilation in Claessens (2005), the 
original surveys were conducted with various methodologies and at various dates between 1988 and 
2004. Including the date of the survey in the various regressions changes little. 34 
bank accounts is not known but the WSBI numbers are, we can use the fitted 
relationship to compute a substitute regressor. Using this substitute, we obtain G, which 
shows that the relation between accounts numbers and household survey data holds up 
well on a much wider sample. The coefficient values from G can then be used to 
approximate access percentages for all 138 countries in the WSBI database. As a further 
refinement, noting also the correlation between the deposit size data and GDP per capita 
(regression M) one can proceed in an analogous way using the fitted values from M as 
regressors in J, whose coefficient values in turn generates an alternative approximation 
to the access percentages. We call this alternative the synthetic access percentage. 
Figure A2: Fit of the equations linking (a) actual and (b) synthetic bank accounts-
based information with household survey-based access data  
Note: based on Regressions 1C and 1J in Table A1.  








































In notation, let mi is the ratio of MF accounts and bi the ratio of bank accounts to adult 
population in country i; let hi be the household survey-based percentage access, zi the 
average deposit size and yi per capita GDP. Let  k α ˆ  be the fitted values in a log-linear 
regression of b on a constant term and m, and  k β ˆ  the fitted values in a regression of zi 
on a constant and y.  
 
Then, let  i i b b = ˆ  for countries where data on bi is available,  ) log( ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 0 i i m b α α + =  
otherwise;  i i z z = ˆ  for countries where data on zi is available, and  i i y z 1 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ β β + =  
otherwise.  
 
Let  k γˆ  be the fitted coefficient values from a log-linear regression of h on a constant, b ˆ 
and z ˆ .  
 
The  synthetic access percentages are then obtained by computing 
z b ˆ log ˆ ˆ log ˆ ˆ 2 1 0 γ γ γ + + .  
 
A final adjustment is to replace this last mentioned synthetic access data with survey-
based data where available. The result39 is the composite indicator tabulated in Table 1, 
and on which Figures A2, 5 and 6 are based. 
 
Figure 5 also shows the deciles for the synthetic and composite access indicators. Note 
that the synthetic indicator is distributed more evenly than the basic WSBI accounts 
numbers, partly because of the use of a logarithmic transformation of account numbers, 
which is preferred by the data (as is indicated by regression F) and which is consistent 
with the plausible idea that, as deposit account numbers grow, access percentages do not 
grow proportionately. However, the spread of the actual distribution out of sample is 
likely to be also understated by the deciles shown, given that the fitted value has a much 
lower standard deviation than the actual within sample. 
 
Despite the numerous shortcomings of the composite indicator, it has the great merit of 
distilling information from a variety of different sources and placing it on a common 
basis. No doubt the accuracy of the imputation for any given country may be highly 
questionable, but it can represent a first approximation to be revised as new data 
become available for each country. Furthermore, as a cross-country dataset, it has 
certainly potential for use in cross-country regression analysis, where econometric 
techniques can minimize the impact of stochastic errors.  
                                                 
39 In addition, a final adjustment was made to prefer the predictions from B to those from J, where the 
former was larger; i.e., the WSBI data was not allowed to result in a lower composite estimate than would 
be obtained from using the bank data only. As more refined information on specific countries is obtained, 
it is envisaged that this series will be updated.   36 
Table A1: Relating survey-based access percentages and information on account numbers 
Equation: A1.A A1.B A1.C A1.D A1.E A1.F  
Dep. var.  survsave survsave survsave survsave survsave survsave  
Explanatory var.  Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat 
Constant -115.0 **5.6 186.1 **9.5 -63.0 1.0 -60.5 0.9 14.6 **3.2 8.17 1.7 
Log (Bank accs per pop)  25.2 **8.1 18.8 **8.0 11.8 **2.9 11.5 2.1 0.0190 **4.9 
Log (Average deposit size)  14.0 **4.9 2.4 0.4 2.2 0.3 0.00362 **3.5 
Alternative accs per pop  0.017 0.0 0.701 **3.1  
   
   
Omitted observation  Adv Adv Adv  
R-squared / NOBS  0.814 17 0.931 17 0.601 10 0.601 10 0.315 23 0.895 17 
Adjusted R-squared  0.801 0.921 0.486 0.401 0.282 0.880  
S.E. of regression  15.8 10.0 9.5 10.2 14.1 12.3  
Log likelihood  -70.0 -61.5 -34.9 -34.9 -92.5 -65.1  37 
Table A1 (continued) 
Equation:  A1.G   A1.H   A1.J   A1.K   A1.L   A1.M   
Dep.  var.  survsave  survsave  survsave  survsave  Depaccs  Depsize   
Explanatory var.  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff. t-Stat  Coeff. t-Stat Coeff.  t-Stat Coeff.  t-Stat Coeff.  t-Stat 
Constant  -115.9 **6.9  -121.9 **8.3  -188.2 **9.5  -151.0 2.0  156.7  *2.5  1356  *2.8 
Log (Bank accs per pop-synthetic)  25.2  **9.5  26.4 **11.2  18.2 **7.3  15.4 *2.5        
Log  (Avg  deposit  size-synthetic)      14.8  **4.7  11.7  1.6      
Alternative  accs  per  pop        0.131  0.4  12.9  **5.9    
GDP  per  cap            0.280  **9.4 
              
              
Omitted  observation    ROM       ROM     
R-squared / NOBS  0.761  30  0.823  29  0.869 30  0.485 23  0.762 13  0.822 21 
Adjusted R-squared  0.753    0.817   0.859   0.403   0.740   0.813  
S.E.  of  regression  15.2   13.2   11.5   12.9   178.3    1735   
Log  likelihood  -123.2   -115.0   -114.2   -89.2   -84.7   -185.4   
Note: Regressions A-F in this table relate survey-based estimates of the percentage of households who have bank accounts (Survsave) to estimates of the number of bank 
accounts per head of population, average bank deposit size, and the number of accounts at ‘alternative’ financial intermediaries per head of population. Regressions G-K 
repeat this substituting fitted values for the first two explanatory variables from Regressions L and M. Regression L relates the number of bank accounts per head of population 
to the number of accounts at ‘alternative’ financial intermediaries. Regression M relates average bank deposit size to GDP per capita. ** and * indicate significance at the 1% 
and 5% levels, respectively. NB: regression 1F uses the levels rather than the logs of {Bank accs per pop} and {Avg deposit size}. Omitted observations: regressions C-E omit 
advanced economies.  ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The synthetic explanatory variables are the fitted values from equations 1L and 1M. 
Omitted observations: regressions H and L omit the outlier Romania. 
Source: Author’s regression estimates 
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